SSH(4) SSH(4) NAME ssh, netssh - serve SSH v2 over TCP SYNOPSIS netssh [ -9dkv ] [ -m mntpt ] [ -s srvpt ] cd /net/ssh ./n/remote ./clone ./n/status ./ctl ./n/tcp ./keys ... ./n ./n/ch ./n/clone ./n/ch/ctl ./n/ctl ./n/ch/data ./n/data ./n/ch/listen ./n/listen ./n/ch/request ./n/local ./n/ch/status ... DESCRIPTION The netssh file server implements SSH v2 over TCP. All of the encryption, authentication, and SSH protocol are handled by a server managing SSH tunnels that appears as a protocol directory, /net/ssh, similar to those of ip(3) but with an extra level of hierarchy for SSH channels within connec- tions. Options are: -d Increase the amount of debugging output. -k Use keyfs(4) for password validation. -m Mount point for the SSH protocol directory; defaults to /net. -s Name to post in /srv. If -s is not given, no file is posted to /srv. -v Do not verify the remote system's host key (which is somewhat pedantic anyway). This lets us talk to SSH v1 systems. The presence of /env/nosshkeyverify is equiva- lent to specifying this option. /net/ssh contains a set of numbered directories, each of which is an SSH connection that is currently active or has been used in the past, per ip(3). Opening clone reserves an SSH connection, reading from it returns the connection num- ber reserved, and writing to it writes to the ctl file in the numbered connection directory. Reading the ctl file returns the most active state of any connection. /net/ssh/ctl currently implements no commands. Finally, the keys file is used by ssh2(1) to relay information about keys and passwords between a user and the SSH server. Each of the numbered connection directories contains a set of numbered directories, one for each channel used on that SSH(4) SSH(4) connection (see Channel Directories below). Similar to the top-level clone file, opening a connection's clone file reserves a channel and gives access to its ctl file. Read- ing from the ctl file returns the connection number (also the name of that directory). Commands may be written to a connection's ctl file: connect Dial the remote system and perform the initial handshake to exchange versions, lists of supported algorithms, and to establish the encryption keys to use. ssh-userauth Attempt to authenticate a user with the remote sys- tem, with either public key authentication or a password. ssh-connection Currently unsupported. hangup Shut down a connection and all of its channels. announce /net/ssh will accept connection requests from remote systems. accept Do the initial connection handshake with the call- ing system. reject Send back a connection rejection message to the caller and shut down the connection. Because data is always carried over a channel, the connec- tion data file is not used for usual data. However, reads from the connection data file do return the capability needed for sshsession to change identity to the user logging in. As with other protocol directories, opens on listen block until a remote system establishes a connection, at which point, a server should write either an accept or reject message to the ctl file. The local and remote files give the IP addresses and port numbers of the local and remote systems. The connection status file gives the status of the most-recently established channel. Channel Directories In each channel directory, /net/ssh/conn/chan, reads from channel ctl files return the channel number. Commands that may be written to a channel ctl file include: connect Create a new channel over this connection. SSHv2 defines session, x11, forwarded-tcpip, and direct-tcpip channels. The connect command defaults to a session channel if no argument is given. (This implementation correctly handles only session channel requests.) global Reserved for future development. In particular, this is necessary to support TCP/IP forwarding. hangup Shut down a channel. If this is the last open channel on this connection, then shut down the SSH(4) SSH(4) connection too. announce Announce willingness to accept new channel requests from the calling system. The channel data file is the file over which all application data is carried. Opens of the channel listen file block until a channel is opened by the remote end. Unlike the connection listen file, the listening program should not write an accept or reject message to the ctl file. SSHv2 defines a number of out-of-band channel requests, sent and received through the request file. Among these are env, exec, exit-signal, exit-status, pty-req, shell, signal, subsystem, window-change, x11-req, and xon-xoff. Sshsession only fully handles the shell and exec requests. Others are blithely acknowledged, rejected or ignored, depending on whether they are expected to be available by the remote sys- tem. The channel status file contains one of: Empty, Allocated, Initting, Listening, Opening, Negotiating, Authing, Established, Eof, Closing, or Closed. Cryptographic Algorithms During the initial connection exchange, both parties send lists of supported algorithms. The first list is for key exchange; we support diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 and diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. The second list is the set for which corresponding host keys exist; we support ssh-rsa and ssh-dss. The next lists are encryption algorithms, which may be negotiated independently for the server-to-client and client-to-server directions; we support aes128-cbc, aes192-cbc, aes256-cbc, 3des-cbc, and arcfour with prefer- ence given in that order. The final list is message authen- tication code algorithms; we only support hmac-sha1. Keys and Management Various keys are used by the SSH server. Most of them are expected to be stored in the instance of factotum(4) running in the namespace of that server instance. Sometimes there are alternative locations. The first key needed is the host key for server operation. In the case of the keys being stored in factotum(4), these keys will be the first ones listed with proto=rsa and proto=dss. Alternatively, these keys can be specified in the environment variables rsakey and dsskey or in files of the same names in the directory where netssh is started. The next set of keys are the public host keys used by clients to verify the identities of servers. As with the original Plan 9 SSH implementation, there is a system-wide SSH(4) SSH(4) list of these in /sys/lib/ssh/keyring and each user may have a list in $home/lib/keyring. If a public key for a remote server is listed and matches the one offered by the server, the connection proceeds. If a public key for a remote server is listed but does not match the one offered by the server, or if no public key is listed for a remote server, ssh (see ssh2(1)) presents the key to the user and asks whether to reject the key, accept the key only for that ses- sion, or accept the key permanently. The last option causes the key to be written to the user's keyring. In the case of a mismatching key, the accept option can either be to add to or replace the old key. An SSH daemon, such as sshsession in ssh2(1), must also have a list of public keys for public key authentication. Again, these keys must be stored in the factotum instance running in the name space of the daemon's SSH server. Each such key must have the attributes role=verify, proto=rsa, and either user= or sys=. The next key is a user's private key to be used for public key authentication. We only support RSA keys for this, and the key must be in the factotum instance running in the namespace of the ssh(4) instance. Creating a key and put- ting it in factotum can be done by: auth/rsagen >key; read -m key >/mnt/factotum/ctl The key file will normally be loaded when factotum is started, either by way of secstore(1) or directly in the user's lib/profile. See ssh2(1) for rsa2ssh2. The command auth/pemdecode 'RSA PRIVATE KEY' id_rsa | auth/asn12rsa >key will translate a private key used with OpenSSH to one suit- able for loading into factotum. To disambiguate when a user has more than one private key stored in factotum, the following selection criteria are applied: 1. The selected key must have both proto=rsa and !dk= attributes present. 2. Among those keys, the attributes user=, sys=, and any attribute/value pair specified in a -z option to ssh are examined. The value of the user attribute is expected to be the user name being authenticated on the remote sys- tem, and the value of the sys attribute is expected to be the remote system as specified in the ssh invocation. 3. The key with the greatest number of matches (most SSH(4) SSH(4) specific match) is selected. Among keys with equal num- ber of matches, the first is chosen. For password-based user authentication, netssh can run in one of two modes. If given -k, it will validate passwords against those stored in /mnt/keys provided by keyfs(4). If run without -k, it will validate passwords with an authenti- cation server using auth_userpasswd in auth(2). FILES /sys/lib/ssh/keyring System-wide known host public keys. $home/lib/keyring Per-user known host public keys. /env/nosshkeyverify SOURCE /sys/src/cmd/ssh2 SEE ALSO ssh2(1), ip(3), factotum(4), keyfs(4), authsrv(6), dsa(8), rsa(8) RFCs 4250, 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, and 4419 BUGS Netssh shouldn't have to run as the host owner and using factotum(4) correctly would permit this. Netssh should be simplified by removing the top (connection) level of the /net/ssh hierarchy and multiplexing a single network connection after the initial negotiation. This would fit better with dial(2), permit transports other than TCP, and allow co-existence of v1 and v2 implementations on a single TCP port. Better still, use only a single channel (since we don't use X11) and eliminate the top 2 levels. Netssh authentication via keyfs and public keys uses `#¤/caphash', which isn't normally present after cpurc runs, so netssh needs to be converted to use factotum. netssh -k assumes that keyfs is mounted, which is typically only true of authentication servers. The keys file protocol should be documented. Only capable of using TCP for underlying connections. Can't coexist with SSH v1 on the same port. Several aspects of key management still need some work. TCP/IP forwarding and some potentially useful channel requests have not been implemented. SSH(4) SSH(4) Zlib compression is not supported and probably not needed. The SSH v2 protocol is a classic second system: over- engineered, overly complicated, misdesigned and jammed full of pointless goodies. Host key verification is broken, so it's disabled temporar- ily until it's fixed.